In Search of Non-Proliferation Rules
Brian Frederking
May 10, 2006
The United Nations Security Council is at another crossroads. Three years after its schism over Iraq, it is once again unable to agree on a course of action regarding the alleged proliferation of nuclear weapons in Iran. Will we replay the Iraq debacle one more time?
Russia, China, and France again want all rules and enforcement efforts explicitly authorized by the Security Council. The US and Britain again argue that particular countries can, if necessary, enforce non-proliferation rules. This split regarding Iraq three years ago ended up being good for no one: it led to a US invasion that both marginalized the Security Council and cost the US much in blood, treasure, and prestige.
We need to rethink our approach to nuclear proliferation to avoid a similar outcome. What are the rules? Who determines when a rule is violated? Who decides the punishment for a rule violation?
I do not know what the answer is. But two existing international organizations the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) offer models for the establishment and enforcement of global rules. We should at least consider whether we should treat nuclear proliferation the way we treat trade and war crimes. Such a process would differ from the current Security Council process in important ways.
First, the rules are determined by treaties rather than Security Council resolutions. Like the Rome Statute establishing rules against genocide and the current Doha negotiations establishing rules against unfair trade practices, future proliferation treaties could establish rules restricting the production, possession, and/or use of materials that produce nuclear weapons. This would essentially require amendments to strengthen the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Second, delegated experts, not the Security Council or a coalition of powerful states, determine a violation of the rules. Like the independent prosecutors in the ICC and the dispute resolution panelists in the WTO, experts in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or some successor organization would determine rules violations.
Third, the global organization, not the Security Council or a coalition of the willing, determines the penalties for rules violations. The ICC enforces penalties against those convicted of crimes within its jurisdiction, and the WTO authorizes retaliatory tariffs against those who refuse to alter prohibited trade practices. Similarly, the IAEA or some successor organization could authorize some sort of sanction short of the use of force to retaliate for rules violations. Enforcement would be justified whenever delegated experts deem a state to have violated treaty rules.
IAEA experts have already determined that Iran is not in compliance with the NPT. But the IAEA is a monitoring body with no enforcement power. All it can do is report the situation to the Security Council. The split on the Security Council is preventing any punishment of Iran for violating the NPT. If we had a process analogous to the ICC or the WTO, then the delegated experts could already have authorized some sort of penalty against Iran short of the use of force.
This process would have some advantages. Russia, China, and France win by establishing the Security Council as the only legitimate entity to authorize the use of force to maintain international peace and security. But they could no longer use economic interests to override legitimate international security threats. The US and Britain win by making it more likely that violators will be punished, albeit by a delegated international organization. But they could no longer claim legitimacy for ad hoc coalitions of the willing. We can perhaps avoid the extremes of paralysis and unilateral intervention.
Of course, there are powerful obstacles to such a process: the veto powers may not want to reduce their power by delegating such authority; the US may not reduce its flexibility by recognizing Security Council authority over multilateral uses of force; states may not reduce their sovereignty by agreeing to unfettered access by weapons inspectors; and states may not be able to agree to specific rules about nuclear proliferation and specific punishments for each rule violation.
Another important obstacle is the anti-globalization impulse to avoid shifting authority to ostensibly unaccountable global bureaucrats consider the left-wing criticisms of the WTO and the right-wing criticisms of the ICC. Why expect controversial organizations like the WTO and ICC to be models for another inevitably controversial organization?
These are important and powerful criticisms. And yet the current process is untenable. We have to change our approach to nuclear proliferation. We have already decided that trade and war crimes are areas of global life more appropriately governed by global rules enforced by delegated experts. We have already decided that in trade and war crimes there is no national security but only international security, and that therefore we need common rules that we collectively enforce.
We need to ask whether nuclear proliferation is analogous to trade and war crimes in these ways. Is there no national security but only international security when it comes to nuclear proliferation? Must we establish global rules that we collectively enforce to solve this problem? Should we enforce non-proliferation rules on the basis of technical expertise rather than power politics? Does the Iraq debacle convince us that we cannot risk political decision-makers either ignoring or intimidating technical experts? How do we avoid Iran becoming another Iraq?