Evaluating the War on Terrorism

Brian Frederking

March 29, 2006

            How do we know whether we are winning or losing the war on terrorism? What can tell us if we are failing miserably? What can tell us to declare victory and go home?

            We need basic indicators to gauge whether US policies are working. Let me offer two:

1) The number of significant, deadly terrorist incidents worldwide should be declining.

2) The majority of countries around the world should support the US and its policies.

            These are simple signposts. Are the policies working? Is the world with us? Unfortunately, these indicators suggest that US policies are not working.

            First, the number of terrorist acts has been increasing. Even the State Department’s figures show a sharp increase in 2004, up to 655 significant terrorist incidents from 175 in 2003. The number of terrorist acts in Iraq increased from 22 to 198, and this number does not include attacks on US military personnel. The number of terrorist acts in 2004 more than doubled the 2003 level in Afghanistan, Israel, Gaza and the West Bank.

            As you may recall, last year the State Department had to retract its annual report after admitting that it greatly understated the number of terrorist acts. This year the State Department issued its report without these numbers, saying that the statistics are “irrelevant.”

            An analysis by Todd Sandler (USC) and Walter Enders (Alabama) in the Spring 2005 issue of Journal of Conflict Resolution also shows that 9/11 was not a significant turning point in global terrorism trends. More important turning points were 1979, when the Iranian Revolution ushered in a rise of fundamentalist terrorism, and 1990, when fewer states sponsored terrorism after the end of the cold war.

            Sandler and Enders show that little has changed in global terrorism trends before and after 9/11. The only changes they found were a decrease in hostage taking and a sharp increase in deadly bombings. This does not show much evidence of progress in the war on terrorism.

            Second, very few countries support the US and its policies in the war on terrorism. Global polls conducted by the Pew Center since 9/11 show dramatic increases in anti-Americanism around the world. The US now has unfavorable ratings of 63% in Turkey, 61% in Pakistan, 93% in Jordan, 59% in Germany, 62% in France, 44% in Russia, and 34% in Britain. A majority in all of these countries says that the US does not consider others when it acts (this number was 84% in France and 27% in the US).

            Astonishingly, a majority of people around the world said that US policy caused the 9/11 attacks, including 60% in Asia, 81% in the Middle East, and 76% of all Islamic states. And majorities in all countries polled except Britain question the sincerity of US policies; most say that US motives are really to control Middle Eastern oil, to target unfriendly Muslim governments, or simply to dominate the world. Majorities in Indonesia, Pakistan, Nigeria, Turkey, Russia, Lebanon, Jordan, and Kuwait are worried about a US invasion of their country.

No serious discussion of the war on terrorism can ignore these numbers. The policies are not working. And the world is not with us. US policies have both failed to reduce terrorist acts and alienated the world.

Little of our national debate centers on this evidence. Both sides are consumed by Iraq. The domestic critics of US policy cite the growing insurgency and the length of the occupation. The supporters of US policy cite the ongoing development of Iraqi political institutions.

Yet the war on terrorism also includes policies in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia, the West Bank, and the Philippines. It relies on the cooperation of regimes in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Germany, and France. We need to start looking at the bigger picture.

This evidence is also important because it suggests an alternative set of polices. Perhaps we are losing the war on terrorism BECAUSE the world is not with us.

We need to realize that the unilateral use of US military power cannot win the war on terrorism. Despite the rhetoric, it’s not really a war. It’s a global criminal justice operation. We’re looking for the bad guys. And as every cop will tell you, their job requires the trust and cooperation of regular citizens.

So how are we supposed to catch the bad guys when a majority of the world’s citizens do not trust us? Only when we reach the unsettling conclusion that our security requires the cooperation of others will we have a serious discussion about how to win the war on terrorism.