While many types of constructivist arguments exist, all constructivists agree that intersubjective rules are fundamentally important in world politics (Hopf 1998, Checkel 1998, Adler 1997). Some constructivists emphasize the role of cultural beliefs (Lapid and Kratochwil 1996, Weldes 1996, Adler and Haas 1992). Some emphasize the role of social norms (Kratochwil 1989, Finnemore 1996, Finnemore Sikkink 1998, and Price and Tannenwald 1996). Some emphasize the role of shared identities (Risse-Kappen 1997, Barnett 1995). The 'hard core' of constructivism, then, is the ontological argument that intersubjectively constructed social rules - cultural beliefs, social norms, and shared identities - constitute the structure of world politics. Wendt (1999) defends this ontological hard core of constructivism in his recent Social Theory of International Politics.

Wendt’s Social Theory is simultaneously a bust and a boon for the constructivist research program. It is a bust because his 'thin' constructivism does not adequately distinguish constructivism from rationalist approaches. He concedes too many ontological points regarding the nature of rationality and agency to rationalist approaches, and he concedes too many epistemological points regarding the nature of social science to positivist approaches. However, Social Theory is also a boon for constructivism because Wendt's arguments about competing sets of social rules - his Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian cultures - that potentially constitute world politics will be tremendously helpful to the constructivist research program. My ambiguity toward Social Theory is evident in this paper: while I criticize its ontological and epistemological positions, I rely upon his conception of Hobbesian and Lockean cultures to account for the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations at Camp David. In effect, I argue that the Camp David agreements altered the Israeli-Egyptian relationship from one of enemies to rivals.

            This paper has four sections. First, I discuss my objections to Wendt's constructivism. Second, I attempt to put some content into the Hobbesian and Lockean cultures by offering a first cut at specific rules that constitute each social arrangement. Third, I analyze the Camp David negotiations and illustrate how the negotiations and the ensuing agreements constituted a transition from Hobbesian rules to Lockean rules. Finally, I conclude with some remarks about the possibilities and limits of a constructivist research program.

I. A Constructivist Critique of Wendt

            Wendt (1999) posits two fundamental constructivist tenets. First, the structure of world politics is determined primarily by shared ideas and not material forces. This tenet argues that material forces are significant only to the extent that they are constituted with particular meanings. It opposes materialism, which privileges causal explanations based on natural resources, geography, forces of production, weapons, and technology. Second, the social structure of world politics constructs the identity and interests of agents. This tenet argues that social structure constructs agents in both causal (it influences behavior) and constitutive (it influences identities and interests) ways. It opposes individualism, which privileges explanations reducible to the properties or interactions of ontologically independent agents. Rationalist approaches are individualist because social structure has no constitutive effects. Rationalists treat identity and interests as given, asking only how the environment influences behavior. Constructivists go a step further, Wendt argues, and ask where identity and interests come from.

However, Wendt denies that these ontological differences dictate epistemological differences, as argued by Ruggie and Kratochwil (199x). Wendt argues that one can be both constructivist and positivist, asserting an epistemological equality between 'explanation' and 'understanding.' Ontological differences dictate only methodological variations between constructivists and rationalists - they simply ask different questions. In order to make this move, Wendt avoids the constitutive role of language in social interaction. First, it allows him to avoid anything resembling the postmodern analysis of 'discourse'. Second, and more importantly, it enables him to embrace a positivist epistemology and an ontological view of rationality and agency nearly identical with rationalist approaches (Smith 2000, Doty 2000). His is indeed a thin constructivism. 'Thick' constructivists who take the 'linguistic turn' in social science seriously - those who build on Wittgenstein, Searle, and Habermas, none of whom are in the index of Social Theory - disagree with Wendt's epistemological and ontological arguments. Epistemologically, constructivist arguments are within the 'understanding' tradition. Reasons - or invoking social rules based on norms, beliefs, and identity, which are the stuff of constructivist arguments - are not causes. Ontologically, constructivist arguments presuppose a communicative conception of rationality and agency that is much broader than a purposive continuum from 'self-help' to 'other-help.'

Constructivists argue that we can explain much of world politics by focusing on the constitutive role of social rules: intersubjective norms, beliefs, and identities. These arguments presuppose communicatively rational human agents who linguistically construct, and are constructed by, intersubjective social rules. We study what Wendt calls 'social kinds' - our objects of study are constituted by social rules. The epistemological question is how to conceive of the relationship between subject (students and agents of world politics) and object (world politics). Consistent with scientific realism (although see Smith 2000), Wendt argues that the world exists independently of human beings, that theory refers to the world, and that the world influences our senses so that we can tell it like it is. In other words, subject and object are distinct, and the subject can 'know' the object. Social kinds remain part of an objective reality independent of the subjects who want to explain them.

However, this is not a plausible position if one takes the constitutive role of language seriously. Language constitutes both the agents of world politics and the rules of world politics. Language constitutes both subject and object. We interpret an already interpreted world. The world does not present itself as objects of knowledge independent of language. The study of social kinds - linguistically constructed agents and social rules - violates the subject/object distinction assumed by scientific realism (and positivism). Social kinds thus cannot stand in relation to humans as objects (Smith 2000). As the 'understanding' tradition argues, subjects cannot know objects independently of human discourse and construction. Subjects can only know social kinds within the context of human discourse and construction. The social construction of knowledge and the construction of social rules are part of the same process. Agents can become aware of the rules and alter their actions. If agents stop acting in accordance to the rules, the rules no longer exist. Reflexivity, or debating the validity claims of competing sets of possible social rules, is thus central to constructivism (Guzzini 2000).

For Wendt, putting ontology before epistemology means making consensus dependent on truth. When we deal with social kinds, our explanations must ultimately correspond with the 'actual thing.' But how can we 'know' that an act counts as deterrence or collective security independent of our intersubjective understandings of the social rules invoked by these actions? How can we 'know' a state independent of our intersubjective understanding of the constitutive rule of sovereignty? What we know about world politics is based on (contested, constructed) intersubjective understandings, not the objective realities of world politics. 'Thick' constructivists make truth dependent on coherence and/or consensus. Truth is based on ‘the conditions governing the justifiability of assertions rather than a matter of the world' (Kratochwil 2000, p. 91), and these conditions include social practices based on human interests.

            Another shortcoming for Wendt is a lack of attention to the concept of 'rule.' When constructivists argue for the importance of norms, beliefs, and identities, they are arguing for the importance of intersubjective rules that constitute the social structure of world politics (Burch 2000). Intersubjective norms, beliefs, and identities are all types of social rules. They are both regulative (they tell us what is permissible) and constitutive (they tell us what is possible) (Onuf 1989). One can recognize the constitutive role of social rules when one cannot describe an agent or an institution without referring to rules (Risse 2000). For example, one cannot describe the state without referring to sovereignty, and one cannot describe 'cultures of anarchy' without referring to identity roles.

The ontological importance of rules has important epistemological consequences obscured by Wendt's distinction between causation and constitution. For Wendt, causal theories ask 'why' and have the following conditions: 1) X and Y exist independently, 2) X precedes Y temporally, and 3) without X, Y would not have occurred. We observe conditions (1) and (2) and posit the logical necessity of condition (3). Constitutive theories ask 'how possible' and/or 'what,' and conditions (1) and (2) are not true for constitutive theory. X and Y are not independent and temporally differentiated; instead, X (social rules) constitutes Y (agents, actions). X tells us what Y is and makes Y possible. For example, the rule of sovereignty both tells us what a state is and makes the existence of a state possible.

Wendt argues that constructivist ontology includes causal theory because rules regulate behavior and because reasons are causes. However, analogous to Wittgenstein’s argument that there is no private language, there are no private reasons. A reason is nothing more than the invocation of an intersubjectively valid rule, and such rules can be ignored. One can have a reason to act and not act. Arguing that reasons are causes conflates the regulative nature of rules with the positivist notion of causation. The two are distinct, and on this distinction rests the ontological and epistemological differences between 'explanation' (rationalist approaches) and 'understanding' (constructivist approaches). Rules constitute action (they tell us what is possible), rules regulate action (they tell us what is permissible), but rules do not cause action. A rule can be universally recognized as a validly existing rule, and yet agents can choose not to follow the rule. Also, interpreting a rule - what Wittgenstein called 'knowing how to go on' - is not a causal process because human agents could mistakenly interpret the rule. In short, 'thick' constructivists who emphasize language and rules are within the 'understanding' tradition. Constructivists help us understand the reasons for an act by pointing out the rule being followed. Rationalists help us explain the causes of an act by tracing a mechanism or finding a statistical regularity (Smith 2000).

Consider the empirical example below. A constructivist asks (1) 'How were the Camp David Accords possible?', (2) 'What made the Camp David Accords permissible?', and (3) 'What are the Camp David Accords?' Using Wendt's categories, one possible account is that the agreements enabled Israel and Egypt to move out of a Hobbesian culture to a Lockean culture, or to go from enemies to rivals. So the constructivist answer to (1) and (2) is 'The mutually recognized validity of Lockean rules simultaneously made the Camp David Accords possible and permissible.' The reflexively and communicatively determined validity of the Lockean rules provided the reasons for the act. Lockean rules both constituted and regulated the agreements. The constructivist answer to (3) is 'The Camp David Accords are a series of mutual speech acts invoking the validity of Lockean rules.' Therefore, Egypt and Israel simultaneously constructed Lockean rules and were constructed by those rules.

However, the causal question is why - 'What caused Israel and Egypt to sign the Camp David Accords?' The existence of intersubjectively recognized Lockean rules cannot 'cause' the act. It is logically possible to accept the validity claims of a rule - to recognize the regulative and constitutive function of a rule - and still not follow the rule. Causal questions require explanations based on material mechanisms or individual characteristics outside the realm of linguistically constructed social rules. For example, perhaps the evolving regional balance of power 'caused' the Egyptians to sign the agreement (Telhami 1990). The positivist notion of causation relies on explanations beyond the realm of human agents interpreting, following, and constructing intersubjective rules. Rules imply choice; causation does not and thus is incompatible with 'thick' constructivism. As Smith (2000) argues, that Wendt's epistemology does not challenge mainstream approaches to world politics. However, the real challenge of constructivism is that its ontological arguments about the importance of social rules are inconsistent with the positivist conception of social science. Contrary to Wendt, 'thick' constructivists argue that the ontological differences between constructivism and rationalism dictate epistemological differences as well.

Wendt's neglect of language and rules also leads to a limited view of rationality and agency. Constructivism encompasses both the logic of appropriateness (Finnemore 1996) and the logic of arguing (Risse 2000). Within the logic of appropriateness, agents follow the rules they deem valid. Within the logic of arguing, agents deliberate and try to persuade each other about the validity of existing or potential rules. Constructivist arguments presuppose communicatively rational agents performing speech acts that linguistically construct social rules (Onuf 1989). Communicatively rational agents convey and evaluate claims about preferred beliefs, norms, and identities, achieve interpretive accomplishments, act in a way logically consistent with their interpretations, and construct the social rules that constitute world politics. Rationality thus refers to the rules of linguistic discourse, not the material efficiency of a particular act (Habermas 1984, 1987). This is a much broader conception of rationality and agency than a purposive continuum from 'self-help' to 'other-help' based on changing identities.

Wendt's engagements with neoliberals and rational choice theorists lead him to largely accept the rationalist conception of interaction and rationality. However, the methodological individualism of these rationalist approaches is inconsistent with the intersubjective arguments of constructivism. For example, social rules based on intersubjective beliefs are different than 'common knowledge' in game theory (Kratochwil 2000). While social rules cannot exist apart from individual understandings, they are not reducible to them. The appropriate analogy for the relationship between social rules and individual beliefs is the relationship between language and speech. Language cannot exist apart from speech, but language is not reducible to the speech acts of each speaker. Individualist approaches thus cannot analyze the constitutive effect of social rules because they ignore the mutual constitution - Kratochwil (2000) uses the helpful phrase 'conceptual dependence' - of agent and structure.

One unfortunate implication of Wendt's influence is that the discipline will equate constructivism with Wendt's arguments, which will only fuel the ongoing mainstreaming of constructivism (Sterling-Folker 2000, Friedman and Starr 1997, Katzenstein 1996). In a recent example, Sterling-Folker (2000) argues that constructivism fits within larger neoliberal arguments by explicitly exploring the identity transformation implicit in neoliberal arguments about the maintenance of cooperation. Nothing in her argument recognizes the communicative nature of rationality and agency inherent in constructivist approaches. Indeed, she denies the difference between the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequences. Her account of constructivism suggests that it is entirely consistent with strategic rationality. This mainstreaming will continue, I believe, as long as Wendt dominates the constructivist landscape.

II. Hobbesian Rules, Lockean Rules, and the Middle East

            An intersubjective conception of structure and a communicative conception of agency and rationality forces one to emphasize the constitutive role of social rules. Rules make it possible for agents to act: they give us choices, they tell us who we are and who others are, they tell us what are appropriate social goals, and ultimately they tell us what we should do (Onuf 199x). All interactions can be analyzed according to the rules invoked and/or challenged by agents' speech acts (Frederking 2000a, Duffy et. al. 1998). Practices, or speech acts, are the ways in which people deal with rules. For example, we can follow, break, change, or eliminate rules. Stable rules and practices form institutions, which turn us into agents and provide an environment within which we pursue social goals. Stable patterns of rules, institutions, and unintended consequences constitute a social arrangement. World politics is thus a social arrangement with many reinforcing and conflicting institutions.

            A linguistic conception of social interaction and a focus on rules can empirically demonstrate the mutual constitution of agents and structures. Analysts can interpret the rules governing a particular interaction - in Wendt's terms, either Hobbesian, Lockean, or Kantian rules - by studying the speech acts performed in that interaction. Focusing on linguistically constructed rules simultaneously emphasizes the choices of agents, the relationship between agents and institutions, the social arrangements that influence agents' choices, and the social arrangements constructed by agents' choices. The construction of social rules is a linguistic process based on dialogic argumentation about appropriate cultural beliefs, social norms, and socialized identities, and this linguistic process constitutes much of world politics. This linguistic process is not reduced to verbal interaction, just as speech acts are not reduced to uttered statements. Non-verbal acts – missile deployments, troop mobilization, etc. – also convey the appropriateness of  certain cultural beliefs, social norms, and socialized identities. That is, they construct social rules through the dialogic analysis of conveyed beliefs, norms, and identities.

Wendt argues that there are three different cultures of anarchy (again, he cannot get away from rationalist language - one who takes rules seriously cannot continue to hang on to the fiction of anarchy, or a lack of rules). These three cultures are differentiated by collective identity roles that govern the use of violence: enemy (Hobbesian culture), rival (Lockean culture), and friend (Kantian culture). I will focus only on the Hobbesian and Lockean culture for the purposes of this paper. Table One is a first cut at explicating certain fundamental rules of these ideal-type cultures.

Table 1

The Rules of Hobbesian and Lockean Culture

Hobbes                                                              Locke

            1) Others are aggressive enemies.                       1) Others are political and economic rivals.

            2) Others threaten my existence.                            2) Others threaten my security.

            3) Do not attack me.                                           3) Do not attack me.

            4) I am responsible for my own survival.             4) I am responsible for my own security.

            5) Survival is based on relative military                 5) Security is based on alliance commitments to

                 capability.                                                        use force.

            6) The use of force is always necessary                6) The use of force is sometimes necessary

                and acceptable to resolve conflicts.                       and acceptable to resolve conflicts.

Hobbesian culture is constituted by shared ideas that others are enemies. Agents do not recognize the right of others to exist. They are unwilling to limit violence against others, following a 'kill or be killed' motto. Enmity is a property of the system; the military capabilities of others convey an ominous meaning. Relative military capabilities are thus seen as crucial, and agents use pre-emptive strikes if violence is deemed inevitable. In this true self-help system, agents share a realpolitik culture and perform speech acts that make war, communicate threats, balance power, etc. Hobbesian culture is a self-fulfilling prophecy: its beliefs generate actions in others that then justify those beliefs. Tendencies of the system include warfare, the elimination of unfit and neutral actors, and a balance of power among strong states. Wendt argues that only occasionally does the international system regress into a Hobbesian culture.

            Lockean culture is constituted by shared ideas that others are rivals. Agents recognize others' rights to life and liberty through the institution of sovereignty, agreeing to limit violence and follow a 'live and let live' motto. However, the rivalry constituting the system sometimes leads to violence to settle disputes over the behavior and property of others. War is thus a simultaneously accepted and limited practice. Membership is relatively stable; the death rate is low because states tend to balance power in order to preserve sovereignty. Wendt argues that Waltz describes a Lockean world of 'possessive individuals' rather than a truly Hobbesian self-help system. Wendt also argues that Lockean culture best describes the last two centuries of world politics. The Hobbesian culture is thus an extreme situation of warfare and the Lockean culture is the 'normal' Westphalian system of international relations.

            If Hobbesian rules characterized any region of the world, they characterized the Middle East after the creation of Israel. Israel and its neighboring Arab countries identified with each other as aggressive enemies (rule #1 in Table 1). Arab states threatened the existence of Israel; and Israel in turn threatened the possibility of an pan-Arab confederation throughout the Middle East (rule #2). The military buildup in the area was consistent with self-help rules 3-5. But most importantly, both the Arabs and the Israelis consistently accepted the necessity of using force to resolve the conflict. For the Arabs, Israel was the embodiment of Western imperialism in the area. Israel was indeed an enemy to militarily destroy, not a rival with which to politically and economically compete. For the Israelis, threats to their security justified the use of force - the acquisition of territory through war, the violation of Palestinian rights, etc. They had to defend a 600-mile border against hostile states. Its entire population was within 20 miles of an Arab border. At the narrowest point, only 10 miles separated Jordan from the Mediterranean Sea. In 1967 Israel spent 21% of its GNP on defense.

            If Hobbesian rules applied to the Middle East at that time, then the states in the area were not (yet) socialized into the ‘normal’ rules of Lockean culture. As Barnett (199x) argues, the fundamental rule of state sovereignty was often secondary to Arab nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s. Citizens were more likely to identify with Arabism, Arab interests, and Arab unity than to their own nation-state. Any state acting in its own, narrow interests and undermining Arab interests would be condemned as a traitor. The short-lived United Arab Republic (UAR) epitomized the hopes of a pan-Arabic region. The ‘other’ was Israel, but it was defined in terms of Arabism, not state borders. The Nasserite Arab agenda attempted to get military aid from the Soviets, to strengthen Arab unity, and establish a homeland for the Palestinians. Its policies were based on the principles of anti-imperialism, Arabism, and ‘positive neutralism.’

The Six Days War in June 1967 changed Arab goals. In six days Israel captured Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights, totally humiliating the Arab world. The war dramatically improved the Israeli military position; it would be difficult for the Arabs to militarily destroy Israel. For some in the Arab world, including the leaders of Iraq, Syria, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Arabs lost the war because of a lack of Arab unity. Arabs had made too many compromises with the West, turning to secularism and forgetting tradition and religion. For some in this group Arabism turned into a radical form of Islam and expressed itself exclusively in relation to the conflict with Israel.

            For others in the Arab world, the war was the final reminder that Arabism could not deliver on its promises. Indeed, the UAR had failed. Many leaders tried to instill an attachment of Arabs to their states as a means of resisting fundamentalist Islam. Also, the growing importance of oil convinced many to pursue wealth rather than revolution. Instead, they began to invoke ‘normal’ Lockean rules, at least with respect to each other. At the Khartoum summit in August 1967, Arab states agreed to recognize each other's sovereignty and the legitimacy of separate Arab experiments. They agreed to end propaganda wars against each other in the media; in particular, Nasser shut down his Voice of the Arabs radio broadcasts.

            Arab nationalism was now about the struggle with Israel, not a pan-Arabic drive for unification. Hobbesian rules still applied to Israel: the Arabs at Khartoum agreed to the three ‘no’s’: no negotiations, no recognition, and no peace with Israel. Any diplomatic activity toward peace violated the three no’s. Nasser wanted the Sinai back, by force if necessary. Yet despite the stated Arab unity, the war changed Egypt’s primary goal to retaining Egyptian, and not necessarily Arab, land. Still, separate deals with Israel were unthinkable. Sadat’s later moves at Camp David, of course, challenged these rules. The years from 1967 to 1979 represent a transition for Egypt in which Israel went from enemy to rival. As rivals, interactions represent a competition over territory (Sinai), not a fight to the death. After 1967 Egypt initiated an incremental policy of at most limited war (Locke), not total war (Hobbes).

            The October 1973 War of Ramadan (Yom Kippur War) was an important part of this transition. Egypt and Syria limited their aims to Sinai and the Golan Heights in their surprise attack. No longer were they attempting the destruction of Israel. They wanted ‘their’ territory, defined in national rather than Arab terms. The failure of this attempt convinced Sadat to reconsider Egypt’s identity, its relationship with other Arabs, its relationships with the superpowers, and its relationship with Israel. He decided that he would try to regain Egyptian territory through diplomacy, and he announced that Egypt would unilaterally pursue talks with Israel. He ended an almost twenty year alliance with the Soviet Union and sided with the US, hoping that the US would influence Israel and help Egypt get the Sinai back. He began to welcome foreign capital in an effort to revive the Egyptian economy. These moves, of course, unraveled the Khartoum three no’s: Egypt would negotiate with Israel, and issues of recognition and peace would be on the table. At a December 1973 summit in Algiers, Arab leaders accepted the inevitability of negotiations; however, they insisted on a comprehensive solution, including the Palestinian issue, rather than a series of bilateral deals. Indeed, Sadat would very much have preferred a comprehensive solution at Camp David.

III. The Camp David Negotiations

            The Camp David negotiations were nothing short of an attempt to establish Lockean rules in the Hobbesian Middle East (this section relies primarily on Quandt 1986, Brzezinski 1983, Carter 1982, Dayan 1981, Fahmy 1983, and Vance 1983). A comprehensive land for peace agreement would only have been possible if the parties mutually agreed to the validity of Lockean rules in the region. The intersubjective validity of Lockean rules would have constituted the agreement, and the agreement in turn would have helped construct and reinforce the validity of those rules. Such an agreement would have implicated three rule changes: 1) Arabs and Israelis are political and economic rivals (Locke), not aggressive enemies (Hobbes); 2) Arabs and Israelis threaten each other's security, not each other's existence; and 3) the use of force is sometimes necessary and acceptable to resolve conflicts, not always necessary and acceptable to resolve conflicts. Egypt’s initial positions at Camp David supported this transition throughout the entire Middle East. Israel, however, would only agree to establish Lockean rules with Egypt. Their arguments implicated that Hobbesian rules still applied to their relationships with the Palestinians and other Arab countries in the region.

For the purposes of this paper, I will reduce the complex negotiations to six issues (Table 2): 1) the nature of the settlement, 2) the extent of Israeli military withdrawal in the occupied territories, 3) the future of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, 4) the extent and timing of Palestinian self-determination, 5) the status of Jerusalem, and 6) the conditions under which Egypt would recognize and establish normal relations with Israel. I will argue that Egyptian positions invoked the validity of Lockean rules in the entire region. Israeli positions, however, invoked the validity of Hobbesian rules in the entire region. They were only willing to establish Lockean rules bilaterally with Egypt. Of course, the Camp David Accords and the ensuing peace treaty was much closer to the Israeli position than the Egyptian position.

Table 2

Initial Egyptian and Israeli Positions at Camp David

Issue 1: Type of settlement

            Egypt: Comprehensive settlement based on UN Resolution 242

            Israel: Bilateral agreement between Israel and Egypt

Issue 2: Israeli withdrawal

            Egypt: Full Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories

            Israel: No withdrawal from West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem

Issue 3: Israeli settlements

            Egypt: Full Israeli withdrawal from all Israeli settlements

            Israel: No withdrawal from any settlements in the Sinai or West Bank

Issue 4: Palestinian self-determination

            Egypt: Israel should transfer power after a five-year transition

            Israel: No Palestinian self-determination

Issue 5: Jerusalem

            Egypt: Israeli withdrawal to the 1949 lines; Arab sovereignty over the Arab sector

            Israel: No withdrawal from Jerusalem

Issue 6: Recognition of Israel

Egypt: If Israel agrees to issues 1-5, then Egypt will recognize Israel and establish normal relations

Israel: If Egypt recognizes Israel and establishes normal relations, Israel will withdraw its military from the Sinai

            The first three issues were closely related: the nature of the agreement to be negotiated and thus the extent of the Israeli withdrawal, including Israeli settlements, from the occupied territories. Egypt wanted a comprehensive settlement based on the full implementation of UN Resolutions 242 and 338. Israel would withdraw from the Sinai and the Golan Heights to the internationally recognized borders of Egypt and Syria, respectively. Israel would withdraw from Gaza and the West Bank to the demarcation lines of the 1949 Armistice Agreement with Egypt and Jordan, respectively. Egypt would agree to 'insubstantial alterations' of these borders and additional security measures for Israel. Such an agreement would have established Israelis and Arabs as rivals that pose occasional security threats, not enemies that threaten each other's existence. Resolution 242 also included the provision that neither force nor the threat of force is an acceptable way to resolve disputes. In short, it would have helped construct Lockean rules for the region.

However, Israel objected to the full implementation of 242. Begin did not agree with the provision requiring withdrawal on 'all fronts.' He would not revoke claims to the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem. Begin also objected to the phrase in 242 about the inadmissibility of acquiring territory by war. As he maintained throughout his tenure as prime minister, Begin argued that the Six Days War was a defensive war and maintaining control over the territories was a defensive act. Any settlement would have to include substantial alterations to pre-1967 borders in order to ensure Israeli security. In addition, he did not support the withdrawal of any Israeli settlements in the Sinai or West Bank, including military airfields in the Sinai. These are only plausible positions if the territories were buffer zones in a state of war; that is, if Hobbesian rules govern Israeli interactions with its Arab neighbors. The Israeli position about military airfields in the Sinai also conveys an unwillingness to even establish bilateral Lockean rules with Egypt. The disagreements over these three issues clearly hinged on Egypt invoking Lockean rules for the Middle East and Israel invoking Hobbesian rules for the Middle East.

            Even the disagreements over the types of security guarantees and the process of dispute resolution represented this difference. Egypt argued for demilitarized zones and United Nations forces along the borders, the regulation of arms acquisitions, full adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice regarding the interpretation and implementation of their agreements. That is, Egypt wanted the norms and institutions of Lockean society to apply to the region. Israel, again invoking the validity of Hobbesian rules, resisted these offers and supported only a bilateral agreement regarding demilitarized zones.

            Issues four and five - regarding Palestinian self-determination and the future status of Jerusalem - were the most controversial because they had (and continue to have) the greatest impact on the nature of the rules in the Middle East. Would the Israelis and the Palestinians recognize each other's right to exist? Egypt's position was that Israel should immediately abolish the military government of the West Bank and Gaza and transfer power to the Arabs. During a five-year transition, Jordan would supervise the administration of the West Bank and Egypt would supervise the administration of Gaza. At the end of the transition period, the Palestinians would exercise their right to self-determination and establish a national entity. While Egypt and Jordan would recommend that the entity link with Jordan, the Palestinians would decide their own future. Regarding Jerusalem, Egypt wanted Israel to withdraw to the demarcation lines of the 1949 Armistice Agreement and establish a joint municipal council with an equal number of Palestinians and Israelis. Israel, of course, saw this as guaranteeing a future Palestinian state. It rejected Palestinian claims of self-determination and offered instead a 'full autonomy' and 'home rule' that retained Israeli security over the West Bank. Israel viewed itself in a state of war against the Palestinians; it would not negotiate (recognize that they exist and have valid claims) with the Palestinians. It could not agree to 'normal' Lockean rules with the Palestinians.

            The final issue regarded the conditions under which Egypt would normalize relations with Israel. Egypt argued that if Israel agreed to its previous five positions (if Israel agreed to take initial steps to construct Lockean rules in the Middle East), then Egypt would reciprocate and recognize Israel, establish normal relations, end all economic boycotts, and ensure freedom of passage through the Suez Canal. Consistent with its position on other issues, however, Israel wanted to limit the construction of Lockean rules to a bilateral relationship. It offered to militarily withdraw from the Sinai only in return for normalization. This withdrawal, however, would include neither already existing settlements nor Israeli airfields. The overall pattern from these six issues is clear: Egypt invoked Lockean rules for the entire region, and Israel invoked Hobbesian rules for the entire region. Israel was only willing, and in some cases only grudgingly so, to establish Lockean rules with Egypt on a bilateral basis.

            The final Camp David Accords were much closer to the Israeli positions than the Egyptian positions (Telhami 1992, Safty 1991, Brams and Togman 1996). Egypt eventually accepted Israel's positions on four of the six issues (see Table 3). The agreement was largely a bilateral agreement between Israel and Egypt (Issue 1), the Israelis did not withdraw from the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem (Issue 2), the agreement did not even mention Jerusalem (Issue 5), and the Israelis traded the Sinai only for normalized relations with Egypt (Issue 6). The Accords included a five-year transition plan for the West Bank, but the Israelis agreed to 'withdraw' and not 'abolish' its military government (Issue 4). Of course, this transition period never materializes: Jordan refuses to take part, and Israel continues the expansion of settlements in the West Bank. Even the issues over security guarantees and conflict resolution were settled closer to Israeli positions. For example, there is no mention of the International Court of Justice to settle disputes, and the accords included only a modest number of United Nations troops.

Table 3

The Camp David Accords

Issue 1: Type of settlement

Bilateral agreement between Israel and Egypt (Israel's original position)

Issue 2: Israeli withdrawal

            No withdrawal from West Bank, Gaza, Jerusalem (Israel's original position)

Issue 3: Israeli settlements

            Full Israeli withdrawal from all Israeli settlements in the Sinai (Israeli concession)

Issue 4: Palestinian self-determination

Begin five-year transition period of negotiations, but no Israeli recognition of Palestinian rights to self-determination (minor Israeli concession)

Issue 5: Jerusalem

            No mention of Jerusalem (Israel's original position)

Issue 6: Recognition of Israel

            Egypt will recognize Israel in return for the Sinai (Israel's original position)

The only true Israeli concession at the talks was to dismantle Israeli settlements and airfields in the Sinai (Issue 3); in effect, to recognize Egyptian sovereignty over the Sinai and establish 'normal' Lockean rules with Egypt. But Israel would not establish these rules with its other Arab neighbors. Israel did not withdraw its sovereignty claim over Israel; indeed, the agreement did not even mention Jerusalem. Israel did not explicitly commit to withdrawing from the West Bank and Gaza; indeed, the agreement does not even mention Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. And Israel did not explicitly recognize Palestinian rights to self-determination. Hobbesian rules still applied in the region as a whole. Only the rules governing Israeli-Egyptian interactions changed from Hobbesian to Lockean rules. The ensuing peace treaty between Israel and Egypt formally ending the state of war and recognizing each other's sovereignty solidified this transition.

Arab criticisms of Egypt for signing these agreements were consistent with, and helped reinforce, the regional Hobbesian rules. After Camp David, Arab leaders denounced Sadat as a traitor to the Arab cause at a summit in Baghdad in November 1978. They argued that the agreement was unilateral, it fragmented Arab unity, and it did not secure Palestinian rights. They recognized that Camp David finished the process begun by the Six Days War ending the possibility of a regional war that would annihilate Israel. They threatened to put sanctions on Egypt if it did not rescind the accords. Egypt defied Arab warnings and resolutions and signed the peace treaty on March 26, 1979. Even though many Egyptian officials resigned, Sadat successfully brought Egypt into the Westphalian system of nation-states. Egyptian national interests had trumped Arab interests. The rest of the Arab world initially resisted. They imposed economic sanctions, severed diplomatic ties, and expelled Egypt from the Arab League. Despite closing the ranks against Egypt, however, Camp David threatened Arab identity and fragmented the Arab world. As Barnett (199x) argues, the center of Arabism making peace with Israel narrowed the meaning of Arabism and reduced the issues on which Arab states were accountable to one another. The influence of the Camp David Accords on Middle East rules is therefore extremely complicated. Even though the Accords themselves directly invoked largely Hobbesian rules regarding the Middle East, the agreements also began to shift the region toward a Lockean system of sovereign, independent states with separate identities and potentially conflicting interests. The current Oslo peace process is continuing the process of slowly socializing the entire region into Lockean rules.

Conclusion

            In this paper I make a simple constructivist argument applying Wendt’s notion of Hobbesian and Lockean cultures to the Camp David negotiations. Its simplicity, I believe, represents both the limits and the possibilities for constructivist arguments. For those requiring causal explanation as the criterion for rigorous social science, the argument - that Egypt and Israel chose to perform certain speech acts and alter the rules governing their relationship - will be unsatisfying. Why did they sign the agreements? What caused the agreements? What are the generalizeable tendencies that apply to other interactions?

            Constructivists, however, cannot answer such causal or ‘why’ questions. They focus on the argumentative process of agents making and supporting validity claims by providing reasons, and these reasons invoke, construct and challenge existing social rules. Every speech act either invokes or challenges existing social rules. Knowing the reason for an act is identical to knowing the rule invoked by that act. Such a communicative process involves interpretation, judgment, and choice. It also involves misinterpretation, lack of judgment, and silence. An ontology based on the constitutive nature of language and social rules is outside the scope of positivism. It does not explain action. Reasons are not causes; the regulative nature of social rules should not be equated with the positivist notion of causation. Instead, a constructivist ontology helps us understand action. That is, it provides (simple) coherence.

            The distinctions drawn in this paper - between explanation and understanding, between causation and the regulative nature of rules, etc. - speak to the interests behind the social construction of knowledge (and thus the construction of social rules itself - we are part of what we study). If our knowledge interest is prediction and control, then we must assume that others are knowable, manipulable objects and emphasize the aspects of social reality (for example, the material world) that are potentially predictable and controllable. Powerful global actors will demand knowledge based on these interests, and ‘mainstream’ approaches will supply this type of knowledge. Constructivist approaches are unsatisfactory: language and the linguistic construction of social rules are less likely to be predictable and controllable, and they force the analyst to treat others as subjects in a mutual conversation. The knowledge interest behind constructivism is understanding - what reasons do others have for action and what rules are they invoking?

            While these knowledge interests are not mutually exclusive categories, it seems to me that constructivism is more compatible with the emancipatory knowledge interest of critical theory (Price and Reus-Smit 1998) than mainstream interests (tied to Western policy) regarding how we predict and control so that others support democracy, capitalism, human rights, etc. The possibilities of the constructivist research program, then, include a reconstruction of a critical theory of world politics using Onuf’s connection between rules and rule. If this is true, we should re-examine whether the ongoing mainstreaming of constructivism is cutting off potential emancipatory practices. Of course, if this is true, then the constructivist research program will also be limited by a marginalized status as an approach that does not do rigorous social science. Wendt’s attempt to champion constructivism and still be accepted by the mainstream ultimately created such a ‘thin’ constructivism that the knowledge interests of constructivism - understanding and, perhaps, emancipation - were lost to the tenets of scientific realism, where the subject can know the object and tell it like it is.

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