Constructing Collective Security in Kosovo
Brian Frederking
McKendree College
Only collective security can ultimately manage...a world where weapons of mass destruction proliferate and ethnic and regional conflicts trigger massive refugee flows, enormous economic dislocations, unacceptable human rights atrocities, environmental catastrophes, and the senseless killing and maiming of millions of civilians. Madeline Albright
The Clinton administration consistently invoked "collective security" to justify the war in Kosovo. The war was based on a simple Wilsonian rule: when one breaks the rules of the international community, the international community must punish the violator of those rules. Milosevic and the Yugoslav Serbs clearly broke the rules, and the international community punished them. If this is a plausible interpretation, however, why did Russia and China, among many others, vehemently protest the war? How could they interpret the war in Kosovo as destabilizing the development of a peaceful international society? Did they not understand what "collective security" means?
As the great power interaction regarding the war in Kosovo illustrates, the concept "collective security" is ambiguous. The war in Kosovo thus offers an opportunity to achieve greater clarity. Using a constructivist approach, I interpret collective security as one of three potential sets of social rules influencing world politics: collective security, security dilemmas, and security communities. Security dilemma rules and security community rules are diametrically opposed to each other. Collective security rules are ambiguous because some are consistent with security dilemma rules while others are consistent with security community rules. When the United States invokes collective security rules, then, some may interpret it as an act to enforce regional community standards. Others, however, may interpret it as a potentially hostile act consistent with a global security dilemma. I argue that the constructivist emphasis on rules, and an appreciation of the overlap between these particular sets of rules, explains the great power interaction during the war in Kosovo.
The article is divided into four sections. First, I briefly discuss the constructivist approach to world politics and the importance of social rules. Second, I distinguish between rules associated with security dilemmas, security communities, and collective security. Third, I show how these distinctions help us understand the conflict in Kosovo, particularly Russia and China's reaction against it. Finally, I argue that constructing collective security in Kosovo was not a straightforward, unambiguous act, and the West should realize these complexities before it again invokes collective security rules to justify the next war.
Constructivism
Constructivist approaches in international relations are proliferating. While many differences exist, all constructivists agree that social rules are fundamentally important in world politics. Some emphasize the role of cultural beliefs. Some emphasize the role of norms. Some emphasize the role of identity. Constructivism is thus an ontological approach arguing that social rules -- shared beliefs, norms, and identities -- are created from both practice and social interaction and constitute a fundamental part of the structure of world politics. Within this ontological structure, many theories are possible.
My own constructivism is consistent with Nicholas Onuf. Onuf argues that human agency and social structures constitute each other through speech acts that linguistically construct social rules. All interactions can be analyzed according to the rules invoked and/or challenged by agents' speech acts. Rules make it possible for agents to act: they give us choices, they tell us who we are and who others are, they tell us what are appropriate social goals, and ultimately they tell us what we should do. Practices, or speech acts, are the ways in which people deal with rules. For example, we can follow, break, change, or eliminate rules. Stable rules and practices form institutions, which turn us into agents and provide an environment within which we pursue social goals. Stable patterns of rules, institutions, and unintended consequences constitute a social arrangement. World politics is thus a social arrangement with many conflicting institutions -- including security dilemmas, security communities, and collective security.
Following Onuf, I focus on three speech act types: assertions, directives, and commitments. Assertion-rules convey cultural knowledge about the world. Liberalism, neoclassical economics, and the balance of power all include examples of contemporary assertion-rules about world politics. Directive-rules tell us what we must or should do and often include consequences for disregarding them. Examples of directive-rules include the use of force, nuclear deterrence, trade sanctions, and the International Monetary Fund's structural adjustment programs. Commitment-rules are promises to act in a particular way. They often confer rights and duties to agents in political society. Examples of commitment-rules include treaties, contracts, and international trade.
Agents who perform these speech acts exhibit communicative rationality. That is, agents convey and evaluate claims about preferred beliefs, norms, and identities, achieve interpretive accomplishments, act in a way logically consistent with their interpretations, and construct the social rules that constitute world politics. On this constructivist approach, rationality is about the rules of linguistic discourse. On most rationalist approaches, including neorealism and neoliberalism in international relations theory, rationality is about the material efficiency of a particular act.
Such a linguistic conception of social interaction can help empirically demonstrate the mutual constitution of agents and structures. Analysts can interpret the rules governing a particular interaction by studying the speech acts performed in that interaction. Focusing on linguistically constructed rules simultaneously emphasizes agents, the choices of agents, the relationship between agents and institutions, the social arrangements that influence agents' choices, and the social arrangements constructed by agents' choices. The construction of social rules is a linguistic process based on dialogic argumentation about appropriate cultural beliefs, social norms, and socialized identities, and this linguistic process constitutes much of world politics. This linguistic process is not reduced to verbal interaction, just as speech acts are not reduced to uttered statements. Non-verbal acts – missile deployments, troop mobilization, etc. – also convey the appropriateness of cultural beliefs, social norms, and socialized identities. That is, they construct social rules through the dialogic analysis of conveyed beliefs, norms, and identities.
The constructivist emphasis on the linguistic construction of social rules through the performance of speech acts suggests that security dilemmas, security communities, and collective security can be understood as different sets of social rules. I will discuss the substance of these rules in the next section. A constructivist approach to world politics, then, suggests that the war in Kosovo can be interpreted as speech acts performed by the United States and its allies in an attempt to institutionalize certain collective security rules into the social arrangement we call world politics. The negative Russian and Chinese reaction to the war in Kosovo can be interpreted as speech acts challenging the institutionalization of those particular collective security rules. I will advocate this interpretation in the third section, arguing that this approach helps us understand great power interaction since the end of the cold war.
Security Dilemma, Security Community, and Collective Security Rules
Three basic concepts in the international relations literature are security dilemmas, security communities, and collective security. Constructivists interpret each as a set of social rules. Herz defined a security dilemma as:
a social constellation in which units of power...find themselves whenever they exist side by side without higher authority that might impose standards of behavior upon them and thus protect them from attacking each other. In such a condition, a feeling of insecurity, deriving from mutual suspicion and mutual fear, compels these units to compete for ever more power in order to find more security, an effort that proves self-defeating because complete security remains ultimately unobtainable.
Uncertainty and suspicion force groups to acquire power to assure security against attack. But these attempts to enhance security only increase the mistrust of others, who then respond in kind and perpetuate the dilemma. Butterfield likens a security dilemma to two enemies locked in a room and armed with pistols. Both would be better off without the guns, but they cannot agree to throw them out the window.
A security community is fundamentally different than a security dilemma. Deutsch defined a security community as an integrated group in which there is "real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way." Security communities have shared values, common institutions, and a sense of "we-ness," or a mutual identity so that they have "dependable expectations of peaceful change." Adler and Barnett posit three tiers in the development of security communities: nascent, ascendant, and mature security communities. In a nascent security community, changes in technology, demography, economics, the environment, the distribution of military power, and/or new interpretations of reality encourage states to change their military spending, deployment and planning. In an ascendant security community, military procurement decisions reflect interdependent military postures, states begin to share intelligence information, and verification regimes become less important. In a mature security community, states achieve a collective identity and Deutsch's standard of "dependable expectations of peaceful change." States engage in multilateral decision making, have unfortified borders, include no worst-case military planning, agree to common definitions of threat, and act in a way consistent with community standards.
Table 1 is a first cut at positing certain fundamental rules that constitute security dilemmas and security communities. It is not intended to be exhaustive. Security dilemmas are essentially sets of deterrence rules. The fundamental rule of all security dilemmas is a directive not to attack or invade. Within security dilemmas, security refers to the security of individual states. Security is about ensuring "my" own security against the threat that "you" pose, fueling a zero-sum competition. This concept of security is tied to the territorial integrity of independent, sovereign nation-states. In short, security dilemmas rely on certain beliefs, norms, and identities: 1) "self-help" beliefs that one must provide for one's own security through military capability; 2) a norm justifying the use of force as an acceptable way to ensure security; and 3) an identification of the other as an aggressive enemy and oneself as a defensive state.
Table 1 |
|
| Security Dilemmas | Security Communities |
| Do not attack or invade my state. | Do not break the rules of our community. |
| I am responsible for my own security. | We are all responsible for our security. |
| Security is based on military capability. | Security is based on political relationships. |
| I will retaliate if you do attack or invade my state. | We expect peaceful change. |
| The use of force is sometimes acceptable. | The use of force is not acceptable. |
| You are an aggressive enemy. | We are peaceful friends. |
While security dilemma rules assert that security is based on military capability, security community rules assert that security is based on political relationships. While those in security dilemmas believe that the use of force is often appropriate, members of security communities never do. While those in security dilemmas identify others as enemies, members of security communities identify others as allies. Within security communities, security refers to the stability of the entire system, or "our" security. The safety of individual borders is less important than systemic threats like nuclear war, environmental degradation, economic collapse, and ethnic conflict. Ensuring security in these matters requires communicatively rational agents making multilateral decisions. Security dilemmas and security communities are thus contradictory social arrangements. Security dilemmas encourage self-help and alliance formation in order to ensure security through military power. Security communities encourage peaceful, multilateral decision-making in order to ensure security through political relationships.
While the relation between these two sets of rules is relatively straightforward, collective security rules are ambiguous. Some associate collective security with alliance practices consistent with security dilemma rules, as if any joint action in self-defense is "collective" security. On the other hand, many others associate collective security with institutional practices consistent with security community rules, as if collective security is the mechanism to an ideal, peaceful world. I believe that confusion exists because the rules constituting collective security arrangements are a mixture of the rules associated with both security dilemmas and security communities (Table 2).
Table 2 |
| Do not break the rules of our community. (Security community rule) |
| We are all responsible for our common security. (Security community rule) |
| Security is based on a multilateral commitment to use military capability. (Hybrid rule) |
| We will retaliate if you break the rules of the community. (Hybrid rule) |
| The use of force is sometimes necessary and acceptable. (Security dilemma rule) |
| We are fellow citizens. (Hybrid rule) |
Do not break the rules of our community. Like security communities, collective security arrangements enforce community rules. One source of confusion about collective security stems from the wide scope of this directive-rule. The number of community rules to enforce can vary widely. Collective security arrangements with a minimum number of rules -- perhaps only state sovereignty and non-aggression -- seem similar to a balance of power system because the community is only enforcing realist goals. The Gulf War is a good example of this ambiguity -- did the UN act because Iraq broke the rules of the international community, or because Iraq threatened the material interests of the great powers? If we interpret the Gulf War as a speech act, did it invoke security dilemma or collective security rules? If the only time the United Nations collectively acts to enforce rules is when a state violates sovereignty, then it is difficult to interpret that action. Of course, some communities are willing to enforce a larger set of rules, including areas like trade, democracy, and human rights. When this is the case, collective security seems very different from traditional alliance behavior. There is less ambiguity about United States action in Haiti or Kosovo; most interpret those speech acts to invoke collective security rules.
We are all responsible for our common security. This commitment-rule is also identical to a security community rule. Like security communities, security is based on relationships between community members, not the capabilities of individual members. Advocates argue that collective security rules are preferable to security dilemma rules because they present aggressors with preponderant force, not equal force. At worst, they argue, collective security equals the balance of power at its best, when only those directly threatened would form coalition. This rule recognizes that many of the fundamental security threats states now face -- terrorism, weapons proliferation, regional civil wars, the environment, etc. -- can only be met by working together. Indeed, as the development of the European Union shows, the number and complexity of rules a community wishes to enforce may ultimately require the greater integration of sovereign nation-states.
Security is based on a multilateral commitment to use military capability. This assertion-rule combines the security dilemma emphasis on military capability with the security community emphasis on multilateral decision-making. Here the ambiguity results from the scope and meaning of "security." At a minimum, when security is narrowly defined in military terms, this rule seems consistent with security dilemma rules and alliance practices. It requires a multilateral willingness to act. It requires that states interpret an attack on one as an attack on all. If states agree to a broad definition of security, however, this rule seems consistent with collective security system. In these cases, states interpret environmental degradation, the collapse of a democratic state, or the abuse of human rights as a threat to the common security. Ethnic, cultural, political, or ideological differences within the community cannot preclude cooperation and enforcement. Critics, of course, argue that this requirement is often both insensitive to domestic politics and contradicts members' national interests.
We will retaliate if you break the rules of the community. This commitment-rule combines the security dilemma emphasis on the retaliatory use of force with the security community emphasis on enforcement. Again, if the only rule to enforce is non-aggression, then this is consistent with security dilemma practices. Some of the conceptual confusion that exists between alliance and collective security arrangements arises from this overlap. Once the rules to enforce also include trade, democracy, human rights, etc., the confusion disappears. Similar to a security community, this rule also requires a common definition of a rule violation (What is aggression? What is a human rights violation?), which critics argue is unlikely. Also, when the community determines that the appropriate punishment is economic sanctions, success requires universal implementation of those sanctions. However, in a security community, the retaliation for a rule violation is never the use of force.
The use of force is sometimes necessary and acceptable. This assertion-rule is identical to a security dilemma rule. Not coincidentally, it is also the most controversial rule. Critics argue that the use of force is often counter-productive to the goal of global security. A military operation to enforce one aspect of international order may create other sources of disorder. Collective security rules divide the world into good and bad, aggressor and victim. The focus on punishing rule-breakers necessarily pits the moral against the immoral. Indeed, many put collective security in the just war tradition and the historic Western imperialist mission to tame and civilize. The possibility of a global collective security system begs the question of the normative basis of that order. The war in Kosovo illustrates that not everyone supports military action to enforce human rights norms. Even in the Gulf War, the global consensus ended with the transition from economic sanctions to the use of military force, and there was even less support for the use of military force all the way to Baghdad. The United States had to resort to a variety of arm-twisting and side payments to maintain the international coalition. Military force cannot provide a framework for social peace without a legitimate normative order.
We are fellow citizens. While this assertion-rule about community identity is between the extremes of "an aggressive enemy" in security dilemmas and "peaceful friends" in security communities, it is much closer to the security community rule. Good citizens follow the law. Accordingly, collective security rules require a diffusion of power so that every member is subject to the rules and no one can avoid sanctions. The Security Council veto, of course, violates this provision and maintains a two-tiered international society. The dominance of the United States makes any collective security system untenable for many. Is the United States exercising the necessary leadership or imposing hegemony? Is the United States a good "global" citizen?
When the United States cites collective security as a justification for its acts, it invokes the appropriateness of these six rules. When Russia, India and China challenge the appropriateness of United States' action, they challenge the appropriateness of at least part of these rules. If collective security rules are a complex mixture of security dilemma and security community rules, then any act invoking collective security rules can be interpreted in many ways. This, I believe, is central to understanding the great power dispute surrounding Kosovo. The United States emphasized the security community rules conveyed by the Kosovo war, interpreting it as a step toward the development of a peaceful security community in Europe. Russia and China emphasized the security dilemma rules conveyed by the Kosovo war, interpreting it as a step toward the development of a global security dilemma.
Interpreting Kosovo
Two collective security rules are consistent with security community rules -- Do not break the rules of our community and We are all responsible for our common security. Three other collective security rules combine security dilemma and security community rules -- Security is based on a multilateral commitment to use military capability, We will retaliate if you break the rules of the community, and We are fellow citizens. The United States and its European allies clearly invoked these rules in Kosovo. The conflict between the great powers over these rules centered on the ambiguity in scope regarding "our community," "our common security," "multilateral commitment," and "fellow citizens." While the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intended the war as a regional act enforcing regional validity claims, Russia and China interpreted it as a global act conveying global validity claims.
For NATO, Yugoslavia broke European norms by violating the human rights of the Albanian Kosovars. The greater importance of human rights over claims of state sovereignty is firmly established in Europe. The European Court of Human Rights is currently the only multinational judicial body with the power to fine states for human rights violations. As early as 1992, European states agreed in the Helsinki Summit Declaration that human rights issues "are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating states and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the state concerned." The Clinton administration constantly emphasized that Serb ethnic cleansing was out of step with European norms. Because the Serbs violated European human rights norms, NATO agreed in a multilateral fashion to retaliate with military force. The overwhelming consistency of the Kosovo operation with collective security rules confirms the continuing evolution of NATO away from a traditional alliance towards a regional collective security organization.
However, while European norms may support intervention, international law does not justify the war. Regardless of NATO's claims about the regional nature of the war, Russia and China interpreted the war as a global act, invoking validity claims with global implications. Russia, India, China, and others argued that international law does not authorize a group of states to use force against another state to punish it for human rights violations. A global consensus on the relative status of human rights versus state sovereignty does not exist, primarily because many states do not want to create a precedent that may later support multilateral action against them for their treatment of domestic citizens. Without such a global consensus, Russia and China interpreted the war as an attempt to impose Western rules on the global community.
Russia and China also disputed the process through which NATO initiated the war. Interpreting Kosovo at a global level, Russia and China argued that NATO shut them out of the responsibility for the "common" security. The Security Council has acted in the past because a humanitarian disaster was a "threat to peace and international security" under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: Iraq in 1991; Bosnia and Somalia in 1992; Zaire, Rwanda, and Haiti in 1994; and Albania in 1997. However, it has never authorized military intervention by a group of states to redress human rights violations. Russia would clearly have vetoed such a resolution. NATO, accordingly, did not ask for permission from the Security Council. Thus, not only NATO did fail to enforce consensual rules held by the global community; it usurped the Security Council's responsibility for the common security.
Security Council action regarding Kosovo includes Resolution 1199, mandating an end to the acts of violence against civilians, a withdrawal of Yugoslav security units, a safe return of refugees, and free access of humanitarian relief organizations to persons in need. Even though it included no measures of force or sanctions, China abstained, arguing that it infringed on Yugoslav sovereignty. Russia voted for the resolution, but stipulated that further Security Council action would be required if the Serbs did not comply. Both Russia and China abstained on Resolution 1203 endorsing the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement because it was too ambiguous about the potential use of force. After the military operation began, both argued that invoking a humanitarian crisis to justify unilateral armed intervention contradicted the UN charter. They were not alone on this point -- even France, Germany, and Italy would not send armed forces into Kosovo after the bombing campaign ended without a Security Council resolution authorizing such a force.
The final collective security rule -- The use of force is sometimes necessary and acceptable -- is the only one totally consistent with security dilemma rules, and it is the rule that Russia and China most vehemently protested. Their voting behavior at the Security Council shows that they both opposed the use of force in Yugoslavia as an act of aggression. This rule defines security in purely military terms, contradicting a political definition of security and a "dependable expectation of peaceful change" in security communities. The war in Kosovo conveyed to Russia and China that the United States was willing to use force without considering their interests. This was particularly true for Russia, who interpreted the war as a direct threat to its national interests. NATO action within the old Soviet sphere of influence inevitably suggested to the Russians that the West is an "aggressive enemy." Russian politicians from across the political spectrum condemned the war, claiming that NATO would next bomb Russia when it attempted to deal with separatist movements. An April 1999 survey by the Russian Public Opinion Fund showed that 56% of Russians said NATO's motivations were military and strategic; only 14% said NATO acted to prevent atrocities against Kosovar Albanians.
The NATO bombing triggered a myriad of Russian responses consistent with global security dilemma rules. Russia is now revising its military doctrine to prepare for large-scale threats by reinvigorating nuclear weapons capability. It has signed joint defense initiatives with Belarus and others -- including the right to deploy ICBMs -- in response to eastward NATO expansion. It held war games in the Balkans with an anti-NATO bent. It expelled NATO representatives from Moscow, suspended cooperation in the Partnership for Peace program, withdrew its mission and students from Brussels and NATO countries, and withdrew officers responsible for communication between Russian and NATO forces in Bosnia. The Duma postponed the vote on the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START II) agreement, just as the December 1998 bombing in Iraq caused a postponement of that vote. The Duma is also adamant that the United States adhere to the original tenets of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Russians do not believe American arguments that North Korea or other rogue states threaten United States interests. Instead, they interpret American offers to amend the treaty as a first step toward a defense system that could thwart Russian retaliatory capability. The failure of the United States to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty supports those suspicions.
All of these responses are consistent with security dilemma rules, including the collective security rule conveyed by the United States in Kosovo that violence is sometimes necessary and acceptable. They are all consistent with the proposition that security is based on military capability, not the proposition that security is based on political relationships. Kosovo increases Russian fears that the West is isolating it from regional and global security issues. It ends the Russian dream of a European security system without United States influence. In addition to formal NATO expansion, Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Moldova signed a cooperation agreement with NATO in April 1999. Even regarding the post-bombing occupation, NATO insisted on dividing Kosovo into five regions with Russian troops limited to one region under NATO command.
In sum, Russia and China interpreted Kosovo by consistently emphasizing the one collective security rule that is consistent with security dilemmas. They argued that it is inappropriate to base security solely on military capability, to retaliate, and to use military force. NATO invoking these rules suggests to them that NATO prefers a global security dilemma to a global security community. While the Kosovo war may be consistent with regional collective security rules, it is inconsistent with the construction of a potential global security community. The war in Kosovo may look like collective security in the West, but Russia and China interpreted it as an expansion of security dilemma rules. Regardless of one's evaluation of the success of the Kosovo operation in regional terms, political relations among the great powers did suffer. Russia does not want to be excluded from European security questions. Indeed, why should they not expect another NATO operation within its former sphere of influence when the next separatist movement creates another human rights crisis?
Conclusion
The ambiguity of collective security tends to obscure the most pressing issue of 21st-century world politics: will the United States, China, and Russia develop "dependable expectation of peaceful change" and construct a global security community? We must consider whether emphasizing collective security, particularly with speech acts like the war in Kosovo, are in fact counter-productive to that larger goal. NATO use of military force does not encourage the Russia and China to have greater expectations of peaceful change. Can Europe enforce human rights norms within a regional collective security system without alienating Russia and China? Can we invoke ambiguous collective security rules and convince Russia and China to emphasize the rules consistent with security communities instead of the rules consistent with security dilemmas?
Perhaps we need to construct collective security rules based on Kantian rather than Wilsonian assumptions. Wilsonian collective security rules assume that no peace is possible without an effective enforcement mechanism. Kant opposed the existence of an international body entitled to enforce peace by coercion, fearing that any military enforcement of world peace may lead to despotism through the resurrection of the just war doctrine. Kant wanted to end the notion of a just war (a war to end ethnic cleansing? A war to make the world safe for democracy?) because appeals to moral conscience tend to perpetuate conflicts. For Kant, world peace, or a global security community, is a moral imperative that cannot be imposed. It is the same moral imperative that encourages association in a political community to overcome civil war. Both security dilemma and collective security rules assume that order can only be achieved through force. Kant instead stresses the consensual basis of international order. Peace comes not from coercive enforcement but from the legitimacy of the legal order. States must freely accept that it is in their own interests to join a security community and renounce violence.
Of course, Kant leaves unresolved the problem of how to prevent war prior to the establishment of the "perpetual peace." How can the entire global community consider any set of rules appropriate and legitimate? Not all states are willing to build a global security community based on Western notions of liberalism, democracy, and human rights. Invoking collective security rules without a pre-existing consensus will only justify punitive wars against maverick aggressors. Operations like Kosovo are counterproductive precisely because no consensus about the legitimacy of the international order exists. We simply do not yet agree about which situations warrant exceptions to the norm of non-intervention. We must try to make collective security arrangements more consistent with security community rules: improve peaceful mechanisms to resolve disputes, reduce global military spending, encourage non-aggression agreements, protect human rights and improve economic development in order to increase the legitimacy of the international order. Asserting that the use of force is sometimes necessary and acceptable through campaigns like Kosovo does not accomplish this.
The post-cold war conflicts in the Persian Gulf and the former Yugoslavia illustrate the pitfalls and possibilities of going beyond a "nascent" great power security community. The great powers agree on the core value of sovereignty, which has long been a fundamental rule of world politics. Iraq violated the sovereignty of Kuwait, and the great powers challenged that rule violation through the collective security apparatus of the United Nations. However, the great powers disagreed over the NATO operation in Kosovo. Punishing human rights violations is now a core value within the "nascent" European security community. For Russia and China, NATO actions infringed on Serbian sovereignty. Russia and China, then, are not yet acceptable partners to join the European security community. Domestic reforms -- and accepting the norm of human rights -- in those countries will be crucial to their addition to the "nascent" security community. In the meantime, the West should avoid the construction of global security dilemma rules by working toward peaceful change, not conveying a willingness to unilaterally settle disputes through military force.
Notes
1. Albright, Madeline. 1999. 'A new NATO for a new century,' US Department of State Dispatch, April, p. 7. For an earlier discussion of Albright's thinking about collective security, see Albright, Madeline. 1993. 'The new opportunity to build a collective security system,' Foreign Policy Bulletin, July/August, 65-66.
2. For overviews see Hopf, Ted. 1998. 'The promise of constructivism in international relations theory,' International Security, 23: 171-200; Wendt, Alexander. 1995. 'Constructing international politics,' International Security, 25: 71-81; Checkel, Jeffrey. 1998. 'The constructivist turn in international relations theory,' World Politics, 50: 324; Adler, Emanuel. 1997. 'Seizing the middle ground: constructivism and world politics,' European Journal of International Politics, 3: 319-363; and Price, Richard and Christian Reus-Smit. 1998. 'Dangerous liaisons? Critical international theory and constructivism,' European Journal of International Relations, 3: 259-294. The most prominent example of constructivist theory thus far is Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3. Examples include Lapid, Yosef and Freidrich Kratochwil (eds). 1996. The return of culture and identity in IR theory, Boulder: Lynne Reinner; and Adler, Emanuel and Peter M. Haas. 1992. 'Epistemic communities, world order, and the creation of a reflectivist research program,' International Organization, 46: 367-390.
4. Examples include Kratochwil, Friederich. 1989. Norms, rules and decision. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Finnemore, Martha. 1996. National interests in international society, Ithaca: Cornell University Press; and Price, Richard and Nina Tannenwald. 1996. 'Constructing norms of humanitarian intervention,' in The culture of national security, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein. New York: Columbia University Press.
5. Examples include Risse-Kappen, Thomas. 1997. Cooperation among democracies: the European influence on US foreign policy, Princeton: Princeton University Press; and Barnett, Michael. 1995. 'Sovereignty, nationalism, and regional order in the Arab states system,' International Organization, vol. 49, p. 479.
6. See Onuf, Nicholas. 1989. World of our making. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press; Onuf, Nicholas. 1997. 'A constructivist manifesto,' in Constituting international political economy, edited by Kurt Burch and Robert A. Denemark, pp. 7-17. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner; and Onuf, Nicholas. 1998. 'Constructivism: a user's manual,' in International relations in a constructed world, edited by Vendulka Kubalkova, et al., pp. 58-78. London: M.E. Sharpe.
7. Habermas, Jurgen. 1987. Theory of communicative action II. New York: Beacon; and Habermas, Jurgen. 1984. Theory of communicative action. New York: Beacon.
8. For example, see Frederking, Brian. 2000. Resolving security dilemmas: a constructivist explanation of the INF Treaty, London: Ashgate Press; and Gavan Duffy, Brian Frederking and Seth Tucker, 1998, 'Language games: analyzing the INF Treaty negotiations,' International Studies Quarterly, vol. 42, no. 2, pp. 271-294.
9. Herz, John H. 1951. Political realism and political idealism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. p. 231.
10. Butterfield, Herbert. 1952. History and human relations. New York: St. Martin's Press.
11. Deutsch, Karl. 1957. Political community and the north Atlantic area. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
12. Adler, Emanuel and Michael Barnett (eds.) 1999. Security communities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
13. Kupchan, Charles. 1994. 'The case for collective security,' in Collective security beyond the cold war, edited by George W. Downs, 41-67. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan; Kupchan, Charles and Clifford Kupchan. 1990. 'The promise of collective security,' International Security, vol. 20, pp. 52-61; and Weiss, Thomas G. (ed.). 1993. Collective security in a changing world, Boulder: Lynne Reinner.
14. Examples include Bennett, Andrew and Joseph Lepgold. 1993. 'Reinventing collective security after the cold war and Gulf conflict,' Political Science Quarterly, vol. 108, pp. 213-237; Betts, Richard K. 1992. 'System for peace or cause of war? Collective security, arms control, and the new Europe,' International Security, vol. 17, pp. 5-43; Claude, Inis L. 1971. Swords into plowshares: the problems and progress of international organization. New York: Random House; Downs, George W. and Keisuke Iida. 1994. 'Assessing the theoretical case against collective security,' in Collective security beyond the cold war, edited by George W. Downs, 17-39. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan; Goodby, James. 1993. 'Collective security in Europe after the cold war,' Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 46, pp. 299-322; and Hurrell, Andrew. 1992. 'Collective security and international order revisited,' International Relations, vol. 11, pp. 37-56.
15. Guicherd, Catherine. 1999. 'International law and the war in Kosovo,' Survival, vol. 41, pp. 19-33.
16. Negretto, Gabriel 1993. 'Kant and the illusion of collective security,' Journal of International Affairs, vol. 46, pp. 501-524.
About the Author
Brian Frederking is an Assistant Professor at McKendree College. Previous publications include Resolving Security Dilemmas: A Constructivist Explanation of the INF Treaty by Ashgate Press and articles published in International Studies Quarterly, International Politics, Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution, and others.