Metaphors, Freedom and Democracy: Teaching American Government

Presented at the Illinois Political Science Association

Springfield, IL

November 14, 1998

Brian Frederking

Political Science Department

McKendree College

Lebanon, IL 62254

(618) 537-6913

bfrederk@atlas.mckendree.edu

The introductory course in American politics is a "hit and run" course: we scratch the surface of many topics without heavily concentrating on any of them. As a result, students often cannot make connections between the various topics in the course. What does the Constitution have to do with interest groups? What does the media have to do with economic policy? What do elections have to do with the presidency? An effective explanation of the parts often does not provide a sense of the whole. We all struggle to provide some structure and context for the students to formulate a coherent understanding of the political system (Stroup and Garriot 1997; Luger and Scheuerman 1993; Carroll, et al. 1987).

In this paper I will discuss the particular way in which I try to provide the context necessary for students to make these connections. I structure the course around three themes: 1) a game and conversation metaphor for politics; 2) the philosophical advocacy of negative and positive freedom; and 3) elite and popular models of democracy. I use these themes to create two very different pictures of politics. The first interprets politics as a game that elites play in the pursuit of negative freedom (limited government, economic liberty and privacy). The second interprets politics as a conversation among the popular majority that inevitably results in the pursuit of positive freedom (bigger government, economic equality and social order).

I make two arguments about these interpretations of politics. First, I argue that US politics is much closer to a game played by elites than a conversation among the masses. Second, I argue that US politics should be more like a conversation among the masses. Throughout the semester I refer to these interpretations of politics, arguing that the current topic (the Constitution, campaigns, the internal rules of Congress, etc.) helps skew our system towards a game that elites play in the pursuit of limited government. This repetition enables students to connect topics discussed during different parts of the course, like voting patterns and Congressional behavior.

Throughout the semester we also discuss potential reforms to move the system towards a conversation among the masses and whether those reforms are desirable. Students eventually realize that formal democratic procedures are directly connected to substantive outcomes. As the substantive implications of both elite and popular democracy become clear, they struggle with themselves about how democratic they really are. Do we want a system that protects individual rights and tolerates inequality and disorder, or do we want a system that encourages equality and order, even if it infringes on some of our freedoms? In this way students must go beyond an understanding of the current political system; they must also advocate either its perpetuation or its reform.

I. Three Themes: Metaphors, Freedom and Democracy

On the first day we discuss the apathy and cynicism of today’s citizens. We put a list of why citizens do not like politics on the board. The list is always the same: politicians are corrupt and in it for themselves; we cannot do anything to change the system; politics is boring and confusing; all they do is argue and sling mud; they never solve any problems; politics does not affect my life. I then argue that we criticize politics in these ways because we interpret politics with a particular metaphor: "politics is a game."

The game metaphor includes the following assumptions: 1) in a game there are only winners and losers; 2) what matters is the score, or who is ahead; 3) others play the game in Washington, DC.; 4) the rules are static; 5) politics is about winning. However, a competing metaphor of politics is "politics is a conversation." The conversation metaphor includes these assumptions: 1) in a conversation there are only citizens; 2) what matters is the merit of the arguments; 3) we all take part in the conversation; 4) the rules are dynamic; 5) politics is about solving problems (Frederking 1997).

Within the game metaphor, politicians manipulate the system so that they can win the game: for example, raise campaign funds from foreign sources or support the prosecution of a sitting president for lying about sex. Within the conversation metaphor, the essence of politics is the evaluation of arguments. Citizens must evaluate the competing arguments of the parties and individual candidates; members of Congress must evaluate the competing arguments of interest groups; presidents must evaluate the competing arguments of their advisers, etc. Students need to understand politics as both a game and a conversation: they should learn both how politicians manipulate the system and how to evaluate arguments as citizens.

Students immediately realize how the game metaphor breeds our apathy and cynicism. The Lewinsky story has little to do with how we solve our problems. It is more about which party will win the presidency in 2000. As a result of playing this game, our system is paralyzed over Monica, and not enough people are discussing real problems like Social Security reform, campaign finance reform, education or NATO expansion. Because the game metaphor includes the assumption that others play the game in Washington, we look down our noses at, and wash our hands of, the political system. However, within the conversation metaphor, it is our fault if the system is as bad as we think it is. We have the power and the duty to turn our politics into a conversation.

The second theme is two definitions of freedom: negative freedom and positive freedom. Negative freedom requires the liberty of the individual. It is freedom from government authority. As long as the government is not telling one what to do, one is free. Negative freedom thus requires limited government. In economic policy, negative freedom requires economic liberty; the government should not be able to raise taxes or increase business regulations. In social policy, negative freedom requires the privacy of the individual; the government should not be able to regulate personal behavior.

Positive freedom requires government action to provide the conditions for individual freedom. Under this definition of freedom, one is only free if the government puts criminals in jail, ensures clean air and water, maintains a minimum wage and economic safety nets, provides education, etc. Positive freedom thus requires bigger government. In economic policy, positive freedom requires the pursuit of a minimum level of economic equality. In social policy, positive freedom requires the government to maintain order and social standards; the government should encourage school prayer, regulate pornography, homosexuality and abortion, and reduce crime.

Applying these two definitions of freedom to economic and social policy provides the four main arguments in American politics: liberal, conservative, populist and libertarian (Table 1). Liberals, preferring economic equality and individual privacy, advocate positive freedom in economic and negative freedom in social policy. Conservatives, preferring economic liberty and social order, advocate negative freedom in economic and positive freedom in social policy. Populists, preferring economic equality and social order, advocate positive freedom in both economic and social policy. And libertarians, preferring economic liberty and individual privacy, advocate negative freedom in both economic and social policy.

Table 1

Four Arguments in American Politics

Type of Freedom in Economic Policy --

Economic Intervention?

Positive Freedom - Yes Negative Freedom - No

Positive

Freedom - Populist Conservative

Yes

Type of Freedom

Social Intervention?

Negative

Freedom - Liberal Libertarian

No

Liberals and conservatives disagree over which definition of freedom -- and therefore how much government activity -- is appropriate in each policy area. This dispute fuels most of the debates in our political system. Is it not interesting that liberals and conservatives change their definition of freedom depending on the issue? At least libertarians and populists are consistent. Still, given the pervasiveness of the terms "liberal" and "conservative," I usually call libertarians "economically conservative and socially liberal" and populists "economically liberal and socially conservative." My resident libertarian, Barry Goldwater, sounds like Richard Gephardt on social issues like abortion and gay rights. My resident populist, Pat Buchanan, sounds like Gephardt on economic issues like tariff protection. These four arguments show that policy disputes are based on larger philosophical differences over the social goals of equality/liberty and privacy/order. All are reasonable, but contradictory, goals.

The third theme is two competing models of democracy: elite democracy and popular democracy (Miroff, et al. 1995). The models of democracy provide connections between the three themes to structure the course. Elite democracy includes the following assumptions: 1) the masses tend to be uninformed, intolerant and selfish; 2) elites acquire power by competing for people’s votes; 3) government representatives are trustees, using their expertise to make political decisions; and 4) government protects individual rights and tolerates inequality. While assumption (4) advocates negative freedom, assumption (1) criticizes positive freedom: the masses would regulate private behavior because they are intolerant, and they would regulate economic activity because they are selfish. Because the masses would pursue these unwanted policies, the elites must wield power. Thus, assumptions (2) and (3) implicitly criticize politics as a conversation. Government that directly responds to mass opinion is ultimately undemocratic because it would threaten individual liberties of privacy and property.

Popular democracy includes the following assumptions: 1) elites tend to maintain their privileges through undemocratic means; 2) ordinary citizens participate in decisions that affect their lives; 3) government representatives should be delegates, staying very close to the opinions of their constituents; and 4) government strengthens community, and inequality divides communities. Assumptions (1-3) advocate politics as a conversation over politics as a game. And assumption (4) advocates positive freedom, or the government pursuit of order and equality.

Combining the three themes provides two very different interpretations of politics (Table 2). Elite democracy is closely connected to negative freedom and politics as a game. One interpretation of our politics is as a game that elites play in the pursuit of limited government, liberty and privacy. Popular democracy is closely connected to positive freedom and politics as a conversation. A second interpretation of our politics is as a popular conversation in the pursuit of equality and order that inevitably leads to bigger government. Each type of system has advantages and disadvantages. I argue that every citizen must decide which set of social goals is more important and then live with the political system that can achieve those goals. If we prefer liberty and privacy, then we must tolerate elite democracy, politics as a game and inequality. If we prefer equality and order, then we must tolerate big government and decreased personal autonomy.

I structure the course around these two different interpretations of politics. I make two overall arguments during the course (Table 2). First, I argue that our political system is much closer to politics as a game/elite democracy/negative freedom. Second, I argue that we should move towards politics as a conversation/popular democracy/positive freedom. In the first week I tell the students that their final exam essay question is to evaluate those arguments. Is the system skewed towards the social goals of liberty and privacy? And should we instead emphasize the social goals of equality and order? Should we keep our system because we prefer liberty? Or should we reform it because we prefer equality?

Table 2

Overall Argument of the Course

The U.S. political system is skewed toward negative freedom/elite democracy/ politics as a game. We should move toward positive freedom/popular democracy/ politics as a conversation.

metaphors for politics conversation game

model of democracy popular democracy elite democracy

definition of freedom positive freedom negative freedom

goal of economic policy equality liberty

goal of social policy order privacy

size of government bigger smaller

The two overall arguments provide a recurring theme for the course. I relate every major topic to the overall argument. Every class session argues that some aspect of the system (voting rates, campaigns finance, the electoral system, etc.) tends to skew the system toward elite democracy/politics as a game/negative freedom. We discuss how certain reforms (universal registration, banning soft money, proportional representation, etc.) could move us toward popular democracy/politics as a conversation/positive freedom. With the accumulation of similar arguments, the students begin to make connections between, for example, voting behavior, the behavior of legislators and the ensuing result of limited government.

II. US Politics is Skewed Toward Negative Freedom/Elite Democracy/ Politics as a Game

After the initial introduction of the three themes, students tend to overwhelmingly prefer popular democracy/politics as a conversation/positive freedom. They cannot get past the procedural ugliness of elite democracy. It only becomes a dilemma for them after they connect different procedures with substantive results. Usually by the middle of the class, students tend to overwhelmingly choose elite democracy/politics as a game/negative freedom. The first step in this process is learning that the Founding Fathers preferred elite democracy and wrote the Constitution accordingly.

The Constitution. The first reason for the skew in US politics is that the founding fathers preferred negative freedom and elite democracy (Meyers 1981: 62; Young 1980: 138). Throughout the Federalist Papers, Madison and Hamilton echoed Lockean arguments about the natural right to property. Government exists to protect property rights. The Articles of Confederation, however, was not powerful enough to facilitate economic progress through protecting private property, regulating commerce and regulating money. The state legislatures operated with few property requirements – consistent with popular democracy – and often responded favorably to the pleas of indebted farmers by intervening into contracts or printing more money. To the economic elites, these policies did not respect their right to property (Jensen 1950: 302-326). When Massachusetts ended its farmer-friendly policies, they reacted by participating in Shays Rebellion. The Founders convened in Philadelphia to create a new system of government that would, among many other things, protect property rights.

The Constitution is consistent with negative freedom because its system of checks and balances ensures limited government. To protect individual rights and avoid the "tyranny of the majority," the Founders set up an elaborate system in which all three branches of government would have to agree on any piece of legislation before it becomes law. The Constitution is consistent with elite democracy because it shielded most institutions of government from direct popular control. The Founders did not trust the masses to have directly influence over government officials. Only the House of Representatives would be directly elected. State legislatures chose the Senate, the electoral college chose the president, and the president and the senate chose the judiciary. In sum, the Founders attempted to preserve individual liberty by thwarting majority attempts to infringe on those liberties. In the process, they created a system that does not easily act even when a majority of the citizens want it to act.

Public Opinion and Voting. A second reason for the skew in our politics is the different political beliefs of voters and non-voters. Socioeconomic status greatly influences both voting rates and political beliefs. The more income and education one has, the more likely one is to vote (Verba and Oren 1986). Also, the more income and education one has, the more likely one is to prefer negative freedom (Maddox and Lillie 1984; Huber and Form 1973). Therefore, a higher percentage of those who prefer negative freedom vote than those who prefer positive freedom. This relationship exists across gender; that is, men prefer negative freedom more than women do (Shapiro and Mahajan 1986). It also exists across race; that is, whites prefer negative freedom more than minorities do (Bobo, et al. 1995). The prototypical elite in the US -- an upper class, white male -- tends both to favor negative freedom and vote quite often. Those with two of the three opposite characteristics -- lower class, minority, and female -- tend both to favor positive freedom and vote less frequently.

The reasons for class differences in preferred economic issues are straightforward. Those with more resources often do not need government intervention to live the life they want to live, and they will lobby against any government redistribution of wealth that they believe to be against their interests. Those with fewer resources, though, often do need government intervention (social safety nets, education, health care, child care, job training, etc.) to live the life they want to live. The economic interests of elites and masses conflict, and their definitions of freedom in the economic sphere differ accordingly.

But class differences over the definition of freedom also hold for social issues (McCloskey and Brill 1983). Elites tend to favor privacy over order. They want the government to protect individual rights against the social dictates of the masses. At the extreme libertarian position, elites want to live their lives unfettered from government regulation. The masses, though, prefer order to privacy. Whether the issue is abortion, school prayer, gay rights or prison sentences, lower class citizens prefer strong government to provide order and maintain social standards (Dye and Ziegler 1987). Indeed, much of the Bill of Rights would not pass a national referendum.

By this point in the course, students tend to find themselves agreeing with the elite democratic argument that the masses are selfish, intolerant, and (after I provide numerous examples) ignorant. As self-perceived potential elites, they realize that they do not want the masses determining their tax burden or their individual freedoms. When we discuss ways to increase voting rates from 50% to 80-90% (universal registration, weekend elections, etc.), many argue against such measures. Very few would have done so on the first day of class.

Candidate-centered elections. We then move from who votes and how often they vote to how citizens decide their vote. The process through which citizens decide their vote also skews our politics by encouraging mudslinging campaigns (politics as a game) and gridlock (negative freedom).

The first trend we discuss is that fewer and fewer citizens vote on the basis of party identification. Students initially tend to agree that voting for the individual is a more enlightened position than voting for a party affiliation. The second trend we discuss is that more citizens engage in retrospective voting than prospective voting (Fiorina 1981). That is, they tend to decide whether the party in power has done an acceptable job in the past. If so, they reward the incumbent; if not, they punish the incumbent and reward the challenger. Retrospective voting turns many elections into a referendum on the incumbent. Prospective voting requires voters to decide which of the candidates is more likely to benefit them in the future. Voters tend not to put much stock in the promises of politicians. The third trend we discuss is that more voters tend to vote for president on the basis of a personal evaluation of the candidate rather than policy preferences. They tend to ask: do I like this person? Do I trust this person? Would I be proud to be an American with this person as president? Many do not take the time to understand the policy differences between the candidates.

These three trends together create candidate-centered, instead of party-centered, campaigns and elections (Wattenberg 1990, 1991). Candidate centered elections encourage the mudslinging that is characteristic of politics as a game. If many citizens vote retrospectively and on the basis of a personal evaluation, then challengers can win only by persuading the electorate to form a negative personal evaluation of the incumbent. Offering an alternative policy platform would only be successful if more voters voted on the basis of policy preferences. Campaigns often explore the "character" of the candidates more than they explore competing solutions to our nation’s problems.

Candidate centered elections increase special interest influence. Candidates do not need the endorsement of party leaders to win; they do not need party volunteers to go door-to-door; they need money to put ads on television. In short, the masses are no longer indispensable resources that candidates mobilize to win elections, as they were in the age of machines, bosses and patronage. Today they are more often objects to be manipulated through imagery and rhetoric.

But most importantly, candidate centered elections prohibit a mandate for governing once the election is over. Citizens are not voting for a set of policies or a party platform but for 535 incompatible individuals. Candidate centered elections reduce party discipline in Congress because individual members of Congress do not need party leaders or any particular platform to get re-elected. When Newt comes to lobby for a vote, individual Republicans have the independence to say no. The result is limited government because our representatives have no cohesive program to guide their governing strategies. And recent trends of divided government – with one party controlling Congress and the other party controlling the Presidency – only perpetuate the gridlock that is already built into the system Shefter and Ginsberg 1991).

At this point students are able to make connections between ticket splitting and limited government. However, they still shy away from advocating straight party tickets. The evidence for the decline of our parties is overwhelming even in the classroom.

Winner-take-all electoral system. The US is divided into districts, and each district elects one individual to represent them. Again, voters vote for individuals and not parties. With this system it is theoretically possible for a party to win 49% of the national vote and lose every seat. An alternative electoral system is proportional representation, where parties receive legislative seats according to the number of national votes they receive. Voters vote for parties, not individuals, and a party that receives 49% of the national vote would win 49% of the legislative seats.

Our electoral system skews our politics by limiting voters’ choices and lowering turnout. One characteristic of winner-take-all systems is that they tend to be two-party systems (Riker 1982). A party must win a plurality in each district; by definition, then, a third party would be unable to win any seats unless it is concentrated in particular regions of the country. The US electoral system robs voters of viable third party candidates. Even Ross Perot gaining 20% of the vote made no impact on the electoral college vote for president in 1992. In a PR system, Perot’s 20% would have been necessary for either major party to form a coalition government. (note about coalitions also leading to gridlock)

Another tendency of winner-take-all systems is to blur the differences between the two major parties. Both parties must win 51% of the votes in each district; therefore, each party is trying to appeal to the same "middle" voter. In general elections many candidates assume the support of their "base" and go after the independent voter, often with the same themes. Limiting the choices to two, relatively similar, parties inevitably decreases turnout. Indeed, every European country with proportional representation has much higher turnout than the US. To the extent that popular democracy requires large voter turnout, then reforming the electoral system is necessary to move US politics away from elite democracy (Amy 1993).

Campaign finance. The average winner in House elections will spend over $1 million in1998, and the average winner in Senate elections will spend over $2 million. For House members, they must raise $10,000 a week for two straight years. The skyrocketing cost of campaigns is another part of US politics that favors elites over the majority of citizens. It limits the entry of some candidates and thus the diversity of our representatives; it privileges incumbents over challengers; it gives organized interest groups an advantage in policy debates; it tends to erode public trust in government (Edsall 1986; Baker 1990; Abramowitz 1991; Malbin 1994).

Congress overhauled federal campaign regulations after the Watergate investigations uncovered slush funds and $1 million individual contributions to the Nixon campaign. The 1974 reforms limited individual and PAC contributions to candidates and parties, provided for public matching funds and required full disclosure. However, the Supreme Court ruled that the right to free speech includes campaign contributions, and Congress created other loopholes. Currently individuals can contribute unlimited funds to one’s own campaign, groups can spend unlimited amounts to independently advocate the election of candidates and promote issue positions, and individuals can provide unlimited funds (soft money) to parties. Clearly, if the courts protect money as if it is speech, then the US system favors economic liberty over political equality. "One dollar, one vote" is more consistent with elite democracy than popular democracy.

Interest groups. Interest groups try to influence public policy in many ways. They may attempt an "outsider strategy" of influencing public opinion through television ads, legislative scorecards and press conferences. Or they may attempt an "insider strategy" of directly lobbying government officials. Interest groups generally have two resources to reward and/or punish government officials: money and votes. If money is the more effective lobbying resource, then the interest group system tends to favor elite democracy. If mobilizing votes, however, is the more effective lobbying resource, then the interest group system tends to favor popular democracy. The collective action problem and the law of groups help explain why money is often a more effective lobbying tool than mobilizing votes (Olson 1968).

The purpose of groups is to provide a collective good to the members of that group. Every group faces a collective action problem: how can we persuade potential members to join the group? The problem that groups face is that many potential members choose to be free riders: that is, they do not join the group but receive the collective good provided by the group. For example, everyone who watches PBS but sends in no money during a pledge drive is free riding on PBS. The law of groups tells us that it is more "rational" to free ride in larger groups than smaller groups. One individual free riding on a large group will not damage the group’s provision of a collective good, but one individual free riding on a small group quite possibly could prevent the group from providing a collective good.

Applying this analysis to interest groups, small groups that provide money candidates will be more successful that large groups that can only mobilize votes. Consider the following example. Congress is considering legislation that includes a subsidy for peanut farmers. This pits two interests against each other: peanut farmers and consumers who buy peanut butter. The legislation could dramatically impact the income of peanut farmers; consumers will pay moderately more for peanut butter. The farmers will be highly organized and contribute to the campaigns of those who influence agricultural policy in Congress. Consumer groups will also lobby Congress, but they will be less successful. A member of Congress has two choices. First, she can vote for the subsidy, guarantee continued campaign contributions, and thus risk very little retribution from peanut butter eaters. Second, she can vote against the subsidy, lose the campaign contributions of the farmers, and fail to gain the votes of any peanut butter eaters for that particular vote. That is an easy choice, particularly for members of Congress with reelection as their primary imperative. This example occurs in a variety of ways in Washington every day: money is often more important than votes (Greider 1992).

III. We Should Move toward Popular Democracy/Politics as a Conversation/Positive Freedom

Discussing the three branches of government -- particularly how the internal rules of Congress make it difficult to pass legislation -- reinforces the role of separation of powers in the US system. At this point, students tend to continue supporting negative freedom and elite democracy. Many believe they have been let in on some great secret, and they can no go out and use their superior knowledge for their own advantage. They understand that the game metaphor facilitates negative freedom by distracting attention away from pressing issues, but they seem willing to put up with politics as a game to ensure their liberties through limited government.

During the end of the course, we discuss the budget process, social welfare policy and economic policy. At this point I end my neutral stance between the two interpretations of politics and begin advocating movement toward popular democracy. I argue that a system based on negative freedom and elite democracy will leave many citizens behind. I argue that we cannot have a system based on political equality if citizens are economically unequal. We discuss how little of the budget actually goes to the poor. We discuss the millions who do not have health insurance. We discuss the vast amount of income inequality in the US. We discuss how the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy guarantees a certain percentage of the US will be unemployed, and how Congress’ fiscal policy is reducing the benefits of the unemployed. After each discussion, I ask "can we tolerate this inequality? Is your economic liberty and personal privacy more important than inequality?" More recently I have also asked, "Will you join the elites and play the game? Or will you organize the masses? Will you defend liberty or fight for equality?"

On the final exam, the students understand the complex tradeoffs involved between equality and liberty, order and privacy. They better understand the connections between system procedures and substantive outcomes. Interestingly, they tend to split evenly between the two interpretations of politics. Some are persuaded that attaining the democratic ideal of political equality requires both reforming the system (universal registration, proportional representation, campaign finance reform, etc.) and expanded government programs (universal health care, affirmative action, job training, child care, etc.). Others argue that such a price is too high. These students argue that limited government is important enough to them that they are willing to tolerate inequality. But they all recognize that reasonable people disagree with them, and that the essence of democracy is finding a way to compromise so that very different people will agree to one set of rules.

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